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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses how the quality of the corporate governance system impacts on the market value of 
the financial institutions listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. Implementing a good corporate 
governance is costly, therefore verifying whether the investment is worth its cost is a relevant issue. 
Despite the central role that financial institutions play in the real economy, there are few studies that 
focus specifically on the financial industry; filling this gap in literature is  especially relevant to Italy, 
where the enterprises are highly dependent on the banking system for their financing needs. 
The first step of the present study is the assessment of the corporate governance quality of the sample 
companies through the Corporate Governance Index (CGI). CGI is a scoring model that analyses four 
different macro-areas of governance: Board, Compensation, Shareholders’ and Stakeholders’ Rights, 
and Disclosure. A Cross-sectional data regression is then used to study the relationship between the 
corporate governance quality and the market value of financial institutions. The analysis, using 2010 
data, proves that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between corporate 
governance and performance: this finding supports the hypothesis that governance creates value for 
companies and that investments to implement effective governance systems give net positive benefit 
and should therefore be pursued. Hence financial institutions should be encouraged to improve their 
corporate governance systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Corporate Governance is defined by OECD (2004) as the procedures and processes according to which 
an organisation is directed and controlled. Hence the corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as 
the board of directors, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and 
procedures for decision-making. 
The increasing interest dedicated to corporate governance can be explained in light of the recent 
financial scandals like Enron, Worldcom, Cirio. Both investors and shareholders are interested in 
corporate governance, the former in order to invest with greater awareness and fewer risks, the latter in 
order to exploit the positive effects of a good governance on the  firm value : several studies (Gompers et 
al. (2003), Drogbetz et al.(2004), Beiner et al. (2006))  prove the existence of a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value.  
The relevance of the governance systems adopted by  banking firms emerges clearly after the financial 
crisis of the last two decades, in particular the Asian crisis of the ‘90s and the recent global financial 
crisis, which have pointed out  with dramatic clarity that the banks can be an important factor in the 
amplification of systematic risk. The importance of corporate governance for banking systems  has been 
clearly emphasized also by the Basel Committee, which in 1999 issued a document urging the adoption 
by banks of ‘modern’ corporate governance structures in order to ensure a sound and prudent 
management. 
As implementing an effective corporate governance system is costly, it is important to verify if the 
market recognizes a premium to the firms which make higher investments to improve their systems. 
The research question addressed by this work is whether an effective corporate governance leads to 
higher market value. To answer this question it is essential to measure the quality of the Corporate 
Governance systems. Although many studies address this question in a generic manner, without 
distinguishing between financial and non-financial firms, the literature on the value of corporate 
governance in financial firms is scarce.  
The peculiar characteristics and the importance of the banking sector justifies the need for a sector-
specific study. In fact, the governance of banking firms may be different from that of unregulated, 
nonfinancial firms for several reasons. First, banks assume a crucial role in the real economy. Second, 
banks are heavily regulated and it is important to highlight that the objectives of regulators and those of 
banking firms may not coincide (Quint,1992). Third, the number of parties with a stake in an 
institution’s activity complicates the governance of financial institutions; in fact, in addition to 
investors, other subjects, as depositors and regulators, have a direct interest in bank performance. 
Fourth, banks are generally more opaque than nonfinancial firms (Furfine, 2001).  
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In this paper the Corporate Governance Index (Aboav et al.) is used to measure the quality of the 
corporate governance of the Italian financial listed companies for the year 2010. 
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 is a literature review of the recent and most important 
studies about the relationship between Corporate Governance and value for financial and non-financial 
firms; section 3 describes the target population, the sample and the model used  in the analysis and the 
results; finally, in section 4 we conclude the work and discuss the implication of the findings. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate governance is a pivotal subject in business literature, and the debate about  the  improvement 
of governance systems is of great interest. Both the theoretical issues regarding corporate governance 
and the potential benefits achievable through its improvement  have  been  already  deeply  discussed  
in literature. The   notion   of corporate  governance  can  be dated  back to 1932, when Berle and Means 
argued about the separation of corporate control and ownership. According to the Agency Theory, the 
separation between ownership and control requires an ‘agency relationship’, that is an incomplete 
contract between a principal (the owners) and an agent (the manager).   
Over time not only shareholders have been interested in value-maximisation but also all stakeholders,   
according to OECD corporate governance definition (Cochran and Wartrick, 1988;  Tricker, 1996). 
In the late '90s there was a greater efforts to summarize  many variables into an index that could be 
used to assess the quality of the state of the governance in the enterprises and identify any relationship 
between the index value and the performance of the firm. The first to pursue this were Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, who in 2003 presented a governance index to analyze the relationship  between  Corporate  
Governance  and  value. Starting from the definition of a Governance Index based on information 
gathered from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) they  analysed 1500  American  
listed  firms  from  1990  to  1999. The index, that combined 24 governance provisions, was built in 
such a way that an increase o in the index led to a deterioration of investor’s rights. They  found  that  
Corporate  Governance  is  strongly correlated with stock returns during the 1990s: an investment 
strategy that purchased shares in the lowest-G firms (“Democracy” firms with strong shareholder 
rights), and sold shares in the highest-G firms (“Dictatorship” firms with weak shareholder rights), 
earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per  year.  Moreover  they  pointed  out  how  to an  increase  in  
the  governance  index  corresponds  a significant decrease in firm’s value (measured through Tobin’s 
Q) and how the average coefficient on governance index is negative and significant for both the net-
profit-margin and sales-growth regressions, and is negative but  not  significant  for  the  return-on-
equity  regressions.  
Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s study, Drobetz  et  al.  (2004)  constructed  a  governance  index  in  
order  to  assess  for the year 2001, the  governance  quality  of  the German listed firms of the fourth 
segments of the German Exchange: DAX 30 (blue-chip stocks), MDAX (mid-cap stocks), NEMAX 
(index of growth firms) and SMAX (Small-cap stocks). In the first part of the study they replicated the 
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methodology of Gompers et al. on equity  returns  on  German  data  and  arrived  at  the  same  
conclusions.  In  the  second  part  they  focused their attention on governance and value and they 
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between governance and firm’s value.  
Following Drobetz et al.’s approach (2004), Cheung et al. (2007) studied the relationship between 
corporate governance and value for the Hong Kong stock exchange listed firms in 2002. Using Market-
to-Book ratio as a proxy of value, they arrived at the same conclusion of Drobetz et al. 
Beiner et al. (2006) presented a development of previous works in order to overcome the endogeneity  
problem that plagues virtually all empirical studies in Corporate Governance (e.g., Borsch-Supan and 
Koke, 2000). They applied a system  of  simultaneous  equation  to  detect  potential  simultaneity  bias  
between  governance  and value.  The study analysed 109  firms  listed  on Swiss  Exchange  in  2002,  
through a governance  index, built  on  the  same  procedure  of  Drobetz  et  al.  (2004),  that was the 
results of the sum of 38 variables grouped in five categories: corporate governance commitment, 
shareholders’ rights, transparency, management and supervisory board matters, and auditing. Their 
results supported the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm-specific Corporate 
Governance and  Tobin’s  Q; in addition this result was statistically significant. 
Following the previous work, Aboav at al. in 2010 through a multivariate cluster analysis showed the 
interaction between the quality of corporate governance, ownership structure and other firm specific 
characteristics during the crisis in order to assess the governance quality in the Italian Stock Exchange. 
The econometric model and the Corporate Governance Index that they used is explained in greater 
details in the next section (Section 3) because it is the index used in the present work. 
All these works have a commonality: they analysed a heterogeneous sample that includes both financial 
and non financial firms. A focus on the corporate governance of financial institutions and on its 
relationship with firm value is much less developed: this is yet more true in Italy. Most of the studies 
have focused on the relationship between single parameters of governance (the most debated theme 
referring to board of directors composition) and value, measured often through Tobin’s Q: studies as 
highly structured as Gompers et al.’s or Drogbetz et al.’s studies, but dedicated only to financial 
institutions, are not present in literature.  
Belkhir (2004) analysed the relationship between board size and performance in a sample of banks and 
financial institutions and found a positive relationship between performance and size of the board. 
Adams and Mehran (2005) found a non-negative relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q, which 
is contrary to the evidence for non-financial firms (Yermack 1996, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  
In contrast with earlier works, Mayur and Saravanan (2006) and Bino and Tomar (2007), argued that the 
size of the board has no effect on the performance of banks.  
Mayur and Saravanan analysed the impact of corporate governance on the performance of Indian banks 
measured, alternately, by Tobin's Q and Market-to-Book ratio. The results of their work illustrate the 
absence of a dependency relationship between bank's performance and size of the board.  
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Bino and Tomar in their work examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of a sample of fourteen Jordan listed banks on the Amman Stock Exchange measured 
either through Return on Assets and Return On Equity. The results showed that the ownership 
structure and composition of the board had a strong impact on the performance of banks, while the size 
of the board was neutral.  
The first study that analyses the relationship between corporate governance and market value in 
banking sector dates back to 2007. Love and Rachinsky (2007) examined the relationship between bank 
ownership and information about  governance in the Russian and Ukrainian banks and the relationship 
between governance and performance. The aspects of corporate governance were gathered through a 
questionnaire containing twenty-six questions grouped into five main categories: the commitment to 
corporate governance, shareholders' rights, controlling bodies, audit system and transparency, and 
information. The five categories together make up the Corporate Governance Index. The author used a 
regression analysis to study the relationship between governance and performance; he used several 
indicators of performance as dependent variables, including Return On Assets, Return On Equity, Non 
Performing Loans, Asset Growth,  the Corporate Governance Index as independent variable , and a set 
of control variables. The results of the study is a significant relationship between governance and 
operating performance and a much weaker relationship between governance and value. 
Grove et al. in 2010 examined multiple factors of corporate governance and their relationship with the 
bank's performance - in terms of quality of revenues, ROA, and Tobin's Q - and with the quality of 
loans. The factors that the authors identified captured different elements of corporate governance 
relating to the ownership of the shares, to the structure of  the board, and to the leverage on executive 
pay. The results show a worse performance when board members are older, less independent, and the 
bank has a high degree of leverage. Furthermore, the quality of loans was associated with the presence 
of board members who also held jobs in other councils, and with incentives to remuneration. The 
authors argued also that a weak corporate governance played an important role in guiding risky 
financial decisions. 
The more recent works deal with the relationship between the corporate governance and the 
performance of banks during the financial crisis. Peni and Vahamaa (2010), using data on large publicly-
traded U.S. banks, found that banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms were associated 
with higher profitability in 2008 and that banks with a strong corporate governance record had greater 
equity returns after the collapse of markets. This it is also an important signal of the benefits that a good 
corporate governance system can produce. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
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In this section, the target population, the sample and the model used  are presented, illustrating the 
variables that compose the CGI index, the areas they are grouped in and their relative weights used in 
the scoring model. 
3.1 SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 
In order to study the effect of Corporate Governance on the market value of financial institutions in 
Italy, the target population is composed of all Italian financial institutions listed on the Borsa Italiana 
MTA market. Foreign shares whose only listing is on Borsa Italiana (exclusive listing) are considered as 
domestic; instead, those foreign financial institutions that are listed both in their domestic market and 
on Borsa Italiana are not included.  
The initial dataset used for the analysis is composed of the 17 the firms making the FTSE Italia All-Share 
Banks Index and the 17 firms making FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services Index, as of 30 June 2011, 
for a total of 34 financial institutions. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The cleaned dataset, excluding two financial institutions for which market data is not available, is made 
of 32 firms. Firms are included in the FTSE Italia indexes according to free float and liquidity criteria. 
At the cut-off date of 30 June 2011, the market cap of the constituents of the dataset represents the 
98,33% of the total market cap of listed financial institutions, thus the sample is representative of the 
population.  
The scoring model used for the assessment of the quality of the Corporate Governance system requires 
in input only data which is publicly available. The documents used to collect data are the annual report, 
the corporate governance report and the charter; in limited number of cases, also internal dealing report 
and the ethical code are used. 
3.2 MEASURE 
In order to study the relationship between corporate governance and value,  the following cross-
sectional econometric model has been used: 
ܳ௜ ൌ  ܾଵ ∗ ܥܩܫ௜ ൅ ܾଶ ∗ ܱܥ௜ ൅ ܾଷ ∗  ܴܱܣ௜ ൅ ܾସ ∗ ܵܩ௜ ൅ ܾହ ∗   ln ሺܥܣܲሻ௜ ൅ ܾ଺ ∗ lnሺܣܩܧሻ௜ ൅ ܾ଻ ∗ ܧ ௜ܶ ൅ ݑ௜ 
ݑ௜ ൌ  ܽ௜ ൅ ߝ௜                                
    
The model variables are hereinafter described. 
 index  ݅ ൌ 1,… .27 identifies the listed financial companies included in the FTSE Italia All-Share Banks 
Index and in the FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services Index. 
ࡽ࢏ is Tobin’s Q and it is the dependent variable of the model. 
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࡯ࡳࡵ࢏ is the Corporate Governance Index. Previous studies (Gompers at al. 2003; Drobetz et al. 2004, 
Baghat et al. 2008) have empirically proved the existence of a positive relationship between Corporate 
Governance, measured through indexes, ad value; so ܾଵ ൐ 0. 
ࡻ࡯࢏ is the ownership concentration, its effect on the value is not clear; in fact, high concentration is 
expected to produce high monitoring exercised by the majority shareholders over the management 
(Sheilfer and Vishny, 1986), and therefore better performances, so ܾଶ ൐ 0;  but the ownership 
concentration could have also a negative impact on value because controlling shareholders could use 
their power damaging minorities (takeovers chance is low), so ܾଶ ൏ 0. 
ࡾࡻ࡭࢏ is Return on Assets. Because this parameter suggests how efficient management is at using its 
assets to generate earnings, a positive relationship between ROA and firm company could be expected, 
so ܾଷ  ൐ 0. 
ࡿࡳ࢏ is the annual sales growth rate; a high sales growth rate can affect positively company value 
because it means the company has been able to catch better investment opportunities (Lehman et al. 
2000), so ܾସ ൐ 0; but at the same time the company could incentivize managers to invest in projects 
that increase the dimension but not the profitability, so ܾସ ൏ 0. 
ܔܖ ሺ࡯࡭ࡼሻ࢏ is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Large size allows to exploit economies of 
scale (Baumol, 1959), so ܾହ  ൐ 0, but could also produce worse performance due to organization 
inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966), so ܾହ  ൏ 0. 
ܔܖሺ࡭ࡳࡱሻ࢏ is the natural logarithm of years since IPO. This variable allows to take into account the 
experience of the company on capital markets. A negative coefficient could be expected because more 
recently listed firms are likely to be faster-growing, and perhaps more intangible asset-intensive (Black et 
al., 2003), so ܾ଺ ൏ 0. 
ࡱࢀ࢏ is the capital structure defined as Equity over Total Assets. Between this parameter and value there 
could be a negative relationship because financing with the debt could incentivize managers to operate 
in an efficient manner (Grossman and Harte, 1982; Jensen, 1986), so ܾ଻  ൏ 0. 
࢛࢏ is the error term and is the sum of firm specific effect (ܽ௜) and white noise (ߝ௜). 
Three dummy variables are used  to identify the segment (MIB, STAR, Mid Cap and Small Cap) which 
the company belongs. 
3.3 VARIABLES 
Different sources have been used to collect  the value of all the variables cited in the previous section.  
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Bloomberg database has been used as a source for Tobin’s Q (ܳ), which is evaluated as the ratio of the 
sum of equity market value and net  debt  (debts  minus  cash)  over  book  value  of  the  assets.   
ܥܩܫ is the  Corporate Governance Index and it that includes  76 variables that have been selected on the 
basis of the Italian Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices released in 2006 by the Corporate 
Governance Committee sponsored by Italian Stock Exchange but also on the OCSE Corporate 
Governance principles and CalPERS Code of Corporate Governance (Aboav et al. 2010). 
These variables can be grouped into three categories: 
 “on/off” variables assuming value 0 or 1;  
 percentage variables assuming value in percentage format; 
 step distribution variables assuming different values depending on pre-set thresholds. 
 
All the variables are grouped in 4 macro areas: Board, Compensation, Shareholder and Stakeholder’s Rights 
and Disclosure. 
The Board area analyses the organizational structure of the board of directors and the observance of 
good management practices; for instance, the board  dimension, the age of board members,  the  board  
structure  in  terms  of  presence  of  executive,  non-executive  and independent members, the presence 
of various committees and their characteristics. 
The Compensation area analyses the instruments implemented to align directors’ interests  with 
shareholders' interests;  the  type  and  quality  of  remunerations  of executive, non executive directors 
and top management are investigated. 
The Shareholder and Stakeholders’ Rights area analyses the level of protection for shareholders and 
stakeholders; the parameters considered in this area include, but are not limited to, the level of 
separation between ownership  and  management, the functioning of annual general meeting, the risk 
governance, the attention devoted to  environmental, social and governance (ESG) reports,  the 
presence of a detailed organization chart, the publication of minutes of annual general meeting. 
The Disclosure area analyses the transparency level of companies to  the  economic  and  financial  
community and the quality of the information disclosed. 
Other variables , not related to corporate governance , are used in the model in order to account for 
other effects on firm value. Following Beiner et al. (2006), Return On Assets (ܴܱܣ), which measures 
profitability of firm’s ordinary business, is included because of its influence on firm value. As a source 
for ROA values Datastream is used; it should be noted that Datastream uses a specific formula to 
calculate the ROA of financial institutions1.  
                                                            
1 ܴܱܣ஻௔௡௞௦ ൌ   ሺே௘௧ ூ௡௖௢௠௘ ஻௘௙௢௥௘ ௉௥௘௙௘௥௥௘ௗ ஽௜௩௜ௗ௘௡ௗ௦ሻାሺூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧ ா௫௣௘௡௦௘ ௢௡ ஽௘௕௧ିூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧௦ ஼௔௣௜௧௔௟௜௭௘ௗሻ∗ሺଵି்௔௫ ௥௔௧௘ሻሺ௅௔௦௧ ௒௘௔௥ᇲ௦ ்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦ି௅௔௦௧ ௒௘௔௥ᇲ௦ ஼௨௦௧௢௠௘௥ ௅௜௔௕௜௟௜௧௜௘௦ ௢௡ ஺௖௖௘௣௧௔௡௖௘௦ሻ ∗ 100 
 
1 ܴܱܣை௧௛௘௥ ி௜௡.஼௢௠ ൌ   ሺே௘௧ ூ௡௖௢௠௘ ஻௘௙௢௥௘ ௉௥௘௙௘௥௥௘ௗ ஽௜௩௜ௗ௘௡ௗ௦ሻାሺூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧ ா௫௣௘௡௦௘ ௢௡ ஽௘௕௧ିூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧௦ ஼௔௣௜௧௔௟௜௭௘ௗሻ∗ሺଵି்௔௫ ௥௔௧௘ሻሺ௅௔௦௧ ௒௘௔௥ᇲ௦ ்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦ି௅௔௦௧ ௒௘௔௥ᇲ௦ ஼௨௦௧௢ௗ௬ ௌ௘௖௨௥௜௧௜௘௦ሻ ∗ 100 
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Following Lehmann et al. (2000), Ownership Concentration (ܱܥ) is included; the measure of 
concentration used is the Herfindahl Index, which is defined as the sum of the squares of the first four 
equity stakes; data used to calculate this index was collected using  the Italian  Financial  Market  
Authority  (Consob)  website.  In  line  with Lehmann et  al. (2000), a normalization is conducted in 
order to obtain an ownership concentration  ranging  between  minus infinite and plus infinite. 
Following again Drobetz et al. (2004) and Lehmann et al. (2000), financial reports of the companies are 
used as sources for the data required to calculate the capital structure variable (ܧܶ), which is defined as 
the ratio of equity value over total assets. Following Drobetz et al. (2004), Klein et al. (2005), Beiner et al. 
(2006), two additional variables are added: one  expressing growth, measured as annual sales growth 
rate (ܵܩ), and one expressing firm  dimension,  measured as the  natural  logarithm of market 
capitalization (ln ሺܥܣܲሻ); data sources used are Datastream and Bloomberg respectively. Finally, 
following Drobetz et al. (2004), also the natural logarithm of years since the IPO (lnሺܣܩܧሻ) is considered 
in order to take the experience since the IPO in capital markets into account.  
4. RESULTS 
Table  2  summarizes  the  Cross-sectional  Data  Regression  estimates  for  equation: 
ܳ௜ ൌ  ܾଵ ∗ ܥܩܫ௜ ൅ ܾଶ ∗ ܱܥ௜ ൅ ܾଷ ∗  ܴܱܣ௜ ൅ ܾସ ∗ ܵܩ௜ ൅ ܾହ ∗   ln ሺܥܣܲሻ௜ ൅ ܾ଺ ∗ lnሺܣܩܧሻ௜ ൅ ܾ଻ ∗ ܧ ௜ܶ ൅ ݑ௜ 
The table shows some important evidences: 
▫ there is a positive and statistically significant correlation (coefficient = 0.0164 and p-value = 
0.00463) between Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance; this confirms that corporate 
governance impacts positively on the market-value of financial institutions; 
▫ there is a positive and statistically significant correlation (coefficient = 0,0859 and  p-value < 
0.00001) between Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q; this confirms the hypothesis (ܾଷ  ൐ 0); 
▫ there is a positive and statistically significant correlation (coefficient = 0.0696 and p-value = 
0.04094) between Tobin’s Q and Ownership Concentration, suggesting that high concentration 
might allow the majority shareholders to exercise a better  monitoring  over the management 
(ܾଶ ൐ 0), like in Sheilfer and Vishny (1986); 
▫ there is a negative and statistically significant correlation (coefficient = -0.0032 p-value = 0.07618) 
between Tobin’s Q and Equity over Total Assets; this confirms the hypothesis that debt 
financing could incentivize managers to operate in a more efficient manner (ܾ଻  ൏ 0); 
▫ there is a negative and statistically significant correlation (coefficient = -0.2802 p-value =0.00962) 
between Tobin’s Q and the natural logarithm of Market Capitalization; this seems to confirm 
the idea that large size produces worse performance due to organization inefficiency (ܾହ  ൏ 0), 
like in Leibenstein (1966); 
▫ the relationship between Tobin’s Q and Sales Growth rate and that between Tobin’s Q and the 
natural logarithm of years since IPO are negative but not statistically significant. The first finds 
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justification in the common belief that high sales growth rate incentivizes managers to invest in 
projects pursuing the increase of dimension more than profitability (ܾସ ൏ 0). The second 
relationship is in accordance with the belief that more recently listed firms are likely to be faster-
growing, and perhaps more intangible asset-intensive (ܾ଺ ൏ 0), like in Black et al. (2003). 
5. CONCLUSION 
This work  investigates how corporate governance impacts on the value of listed financial companies. 
To this purpose, Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for value, while the quality of the corporate governance 
system is assessed through the Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The cross-sectional regression for 
the year 2010 highlights that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
governance and value. This result is very important: an increase by 1 point in the Corporate 
Governance Index produces an increase in the value equal to 0.016. This effect cannot be neglected and 
is more ample that what it may seem at the first sight. To appreciate the impact of the governance on 
firm value, it has to be considered also that the CGI difference between the best and the worst firm in 
terms of corporate governance is 47,09, therefore, keeping all else constant, the Tobin’s Q value for the 
best company is 77,33% higher than the Tobin’s Q value of the worst company, and this difference is 
explained solely by the better corporate governance system. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that governance creates value for companies and investments to 
implement effective governance systems give net positive benefit and should therefore be pursued. 
Hence financial institutions should be encouraged to improve their corporate governance systems.  
The positive relationship between governance and value confirms also the results of previous works and 
attests the effectiveness of both the model that was used and of the Corporate Governance Index. The 
CGI could be a useful tool to pursue many objectives such as the improvement of disclosure of financial 
markets, the reduction of the cost of funding, better attractiveness of the firms in the capital markets. 
All these aspects translate into benefits for the investors, who become able to make their investments 
with greater awareness and reduced risk. 
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Table 1 -  Dataset 
Company Index 
Apulia Pronto Prestito FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Azimut FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Banca Carige FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Finnat FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Generali FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Banca Ifis FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Banca Intermobiliare FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Popolare di Milano FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banca Profilo FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Banco Desio e Brianza FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banco Popolare FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Banco Sardegna Risparmio FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Cam Finanziaria FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Cape LIVE FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Conafi Prestito FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Credito Artigiano FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Credito Emiliano FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Credito Valtellinese FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Dea Capital FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Exor FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Intek FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Intesa Sanpaolo FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Investimenti & Sviluppo FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Management & Capitali FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Mediobanca FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Mediolanum FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Meridie FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Mutuionline FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
SoPaF FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Tamburi FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Toscana Finanza FTSE Italia All-Share Financial Services  
Unicredit FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
Unione di Banche Italiane FTSE Italia All- Share Banks 
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Table 2 – Cross-Sectional Regression 
 
Model 7: OLS, using observations 1-34 (n = 27) 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 7 
Dependent variable: Tobin_s_Q 
  
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
 
const 2.37839 0.723198 3.2887 0.00463 *** 
CGI 0.0164218 0.00467669 3.5114 0.00289 *** 
SG -0.000298515 0.000881154 -0.3388 0.73918 
 
ROA 0.0858923 0.00493446 17.4066 <0.00001 *** 
Ln (AGE) -0.157818 0.142446 -1.1079 0.28428 
 
Ln (CAPMKT) -0.28027 0.0953499 -2.9394 0.00962 *** 
ET -0.0031949 0.00168517 -1.8959 0.07618 * 
D_Mib 0.504509 0.254408 1.9831 0.06480 * 
D_Star 0.1531 0.22134 0.6917 0.49904 
 
D_Mid -0.0635759 0.137878 -0.4611 0.65093 
 
OC 0.0695786 0.0312925 2.2235 0.04094 ** 
  
Mean dependent var 1.103438   S.D. dependent var 0.704828 
Sum squared resid 0.426944   S.E. of regression 0.163352 
R-squared 0.966945   Adjusted R-squared 0.946286 
F(10, 16) 46.80487   P-value(F) 6.26e-10 
Log-likelihood 17.67234   Akaike criterion -13.34469 
Schwarz criterion 0.909519   Hannan-Quinn -9.106164 
 
